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Abstract   
Whilst online social networking has been used successfully for many years by all strata of the 
world’s population, its use to ferment and prevent civil disturbances is a relatively new 
phenomenon. It is clear that the way in which online social networking sites are being used is 
evolving, and that changing user perceptions of online privacy may impact on the ability of the 
law enforcement community to adapt to new methods of monitoring and evidence gathering. 
This paper focuses primarily on the London riots of August 2011, and as such discusses legal 
issues from a UK perspective. However, the matters discussed are of relevance worldwide, with 
reference made to similar events outside the UK, to show that what occurred in London was 
not an isolated incident, or a quirk of the UK social networking scene. This paper explores what 
occurred, the platforms that were used and how they were used, and the legal framework in 
which investigations took place. It examines the use of social networking to organise rioters, 
support community defence, and shape the response of law enforcement agencies such as the 
police, government and the courts. It concludes that there is significant potential for problems 
of this type to occur in the future, which will require the evolution of law enforcement methods 
and procedures, and could change the way in which the law enforcement community utilise e-
Government systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Online Social Networking Sites (SNS) have become a pervasive element of society. However, 
policing their use remains a significant problem for law enforcement agencies. Such agencies 
frequently have to apply laws which are outdated, and struggle to apply conventional 
resources such as the UK Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK Government 1994), 
to problems that require new techniques for the efficient gathering and analysis of online 
evidence. The events that took place in August 2011 in London and other UK cities showed 
that social networking could be a force for public order or disorder. They highlighted the 
attempts of government to handle new threats, the police to deal with a considerable ongoing 
influx of electronic evidence, much of it submitted directly by the public, and by the courts to 
handle operation 24 hours a day to cope with the number of cases. This paper examines the 
current state of online SNS with regard to civil disturbances, using the London riots as a case 
study. The paper is therefore UK-centric in terms of law, but highlights global problems.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. The remainder of this section outlines the context to 
the riots that occurred during August 2011, and provides perspective on the scale of events. 
Section 2 explores background research relevant to the domain in question, focussing on 
internet controls, end user actions to support the law enforcement community, and specific 
platform capabilities. Section 3 discusses the way in which flash mobs are facilitated by online 
SNS, using data gathered from social networks during the London riots. Section 3 also looks at 
the support the UK’s current legal framework provides to the law enforcement community for 
handling civil disturbances exacerbated by online SNS. Section 4 examines the direction in 
which online SNS are evolving with reference to the potential for future problems of this type. 
Finally, section 5 discusses the potential for future research within the area and provides 
conclusions. 
 
1.1 Context of the riots  
The majority of the activity associated with the London riots occurred between the 6th and 
17thAugust 2011. Initially confined to London, disturbances spread to a number of other cities 
in the UK including, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Nottingham. For the purposes of 
this paper the term ‘London riots’ will cover events both within and outside London, as this 
was the term used by the media at that time. Although many viewed the riots as without 
justification (that looting was the main purpose), it is clear that there was a flashpoint incident 
which contributed to the first riot in Tottenham London on the 6th August.  The incident 
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concerned Mark Duggan, who was shot and killed during his arrest by CO19 (the London 
police force’s specialist firearms unit) on the 4th August.  The shooting led to an initially 
peaceful protest march, organised by the family of the deceased on the 6th August. The march 
attracted undesirable elements who became more violent as time passed, leading to large 
scale rioting overnight within the London suburb of Tottenham. Over the following days 
rioting spread to other London suburbs including Hackney. Rioting also spread to other cities, 
even as disturbances within London itself subsided. 
 
1.2 The scale of the riots 
The following facts were taken from the Metropolitan Police Service force’s strategic review 
(Metropolitan Police Service 2011) into the riots, unless otherwise stated. 
 The cost of the riots to insurance companies has been placed at around £250million  
  The cost of the Metropolitan Police Service operations within London to be in excess 
of £34 million.  
 Five people were killed, three in a single hit and run incident whilst the victims were 
attempting to defend property in Birmingham. 
 Approximately 2100 people were charged for approximately 3200 separate offences, 
with ages ranging from an 11 year old charged for stealing a bin (Somaiya 2011), to a 
70 year old arrested for looting a branch of Sainsbury’s (The Mirror 2011).  
 
1.3 Data collection method 
The sources used within this paper include government and law enforcement statements, 
delivered either through official channels or released to the media and SNS data. Media 
reporting contains significant potential for bias, and as such has only been used to report facts 
relating to legal cases (where official sources have not yet published their data), or to illustrate 
the nature of the reporting by the media of the riots.  
Where possible the information included within the paper has been verified through multiple 
sources. In the case of media articles the authors accept that a lack of independence between 
articles formed on secondary evidence may lead to a false measure of accuracy.  
The Twitter dataset analysed within the paper was gathered using third party social network 
data mining tools due to Twitters limited inbuilt search functionality, and was gathered 
retrospectively in the months that followed the riots. It is therefore possible that tweets may 
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have been removed in the intervening period between publishing and retrieval, a 
phenomenon which was indirectly observable for some online SNS during the period including 
Flickr.  
 
2. Background 
Many research areas have a bearing on the study of online SNS when considering their 
support for rioters, community defence and law enforcement. This section focuses on four key 
areas, those of government control of the internet in a global context; the perception of 
privacy engendered within the community of online SNS users; the willingness of the public to 
use the internet to support law enforcement processes; and finally the communication 
facilities common online SNS provide to rioters, community defence and the law enforcement 
community. 
The monitoring of SNS by members of the public and the authorities can take two distinct 
forms, those of horizontal and vertical surveillance (Sewell 1998). Regulatory approaches such 
as laws are applied vertically from the top down upon all internet users, whereas official (by 
the police for example) or unofficial (by users) surveillance of individuals and groups forms 
horizontal surveillance. The concept of horizontal surveillance is common within societies, 
with one of its most obvious applications being that of peer pressure to conform to a 
perceived ideal. The relative lack of effective, organised vertical and horizontal surveillance of 
SNS enables dissident groups to flourish by reducing the risks of discovery and prosecution, in-
line with existing thinking on social exchange theory (Emerson 1976).   
In a study by Obar (Obar, Zube & Lampe 2012) research into advocacy groups within the USA 
found that out of 53 groups surveyed, 98% of them used Facebook, 96% Twitter and 77% 
YouTube. The study focussed on established advocacy groups rather than the more temporary 
alliances observed during the London Riots. Obar’s research findings identified links between 
participation and information technology literacy gaps based on generation, however the 
research did not extend to quantifying the extent to which this affected the advocacy groups, 
or to explore the rate of change over time. The study also identified a higher proportion of 
female participants, a point reinforced by numerous studies on SNS, including Tokunaga 
(Tokunaga 2011).  
In related research, Nisbet (Nisbet 2008) highlighted the role of mass media in encouraging 
convergence of viewpoint on issues. Shanahan (Shanahan, Morgan 1999) reported that the 
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effect of media on dissident groups exhibited a stronger convergence effect than on others. 
Nisbet stressed the need for control structures to underpin the role of media as a regulating 
force in democracies. Considerable research still needs to be completed in this area to 
determine if online behaviour and offline behaviour can be examined using the same theories. 
However, it is clear that the lack of societal oversight caused by privacy settings on groups, 
posts etc would have the effect of weakening control mechanisms, making self regulation 
within communities more common. Where those communities are dissident in nature the 
effect of self regulation is likely to be reduced by the bias introduced to the community.  
 
2.1 Government intervention on the internet 
Government control over online SNS differs significantly around the world.  A number of 
countries restrict access to either specific SNS accounts/pages or entire platforms in order to 
prevent perceived dissident use. These countries currently include Bahrain, Belarus, Burma, 
China, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey and Vietnam (Kelly, Cook 2011). Iran in particular has been criticised for its threats 
against Iranians outside the country who are disenchanted with the current government, in 
some cases leading to detainment and arrest (Fassahi 2009)(Erdbrink 2012). The UK currently 
occupies 5th place in the Internet Freedom report (Kelly, Cook 2011), but appears to be on a 
gradual downward trajectory.  It is arguable that the use of tools such as Facebook during the 
Arab Spring of 2011 is likely to increase censorship around the world in future years, and that 
any changes to the law following the London riots may impact negatively on the score the UK 
receives in future. 
The reaction of world governments to civil unrest has in the past extended to the blocking of 
social networking and/or web access, restricting the dissemination of information by the 
public. This seems an extreme measure however, as blocking access also deprives authorities 
of the intelligence that social networking can provide. 
Within the UK, in addition to the legal framework, a process exists to monitor and block some 
web materials, however it is not government controlled. The Internet Service Providers 
Association (ISPA), a trade association for Internet Service Providers (ISPs), has implemented 
self-regulation by adhering to requests made by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), a 
charity, on what internet material should be blocked within the UK. To date, the powers of the 
IWF have been limited to blocking sites hosting content that is illegal under UK law, such as 
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child pornography and racial hatred.  Such blocks are achieved using content filtering software 
such as Cleanfeed. 
 
2.2 User perceptions of social networking privacy 
There is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that the ubiquity of membership to 
online SNS, particularly among younger people, is changing popular attitudes towards 
personal privacy. Gross (Gross, Acquisti & Heinz III 2005) analysed the privacy preferences of 
more than 40,000 US students using online SNS, and found that only a minimal proportion 
changed their preferences from the default open settings. During the London riots a number 
of arrests were made based on information publicly shared on sites such as Facebook  (The 
Crown Prosecution Service 2011).  Fogel and Nehmad (Fogel, Nehmad 2009) also studied the 
attitude of college students towards privacy, trust and risk-taking on online SNS, and found 
that those who had profiles on the sites expressed higher levels of trust, and were more open 
to risk-taking than those who did not. Paradoxically, in an empirical study of young Australian 
users, Robards’ research (Robards 2010) concluded that young people increasingly regard 
social network sites as private spaces to ‘hang out’, akin to teenagers’ bedrooms, or to 
shopping centres and parks. He goes on to argue that, across the world, young people are 
developing ever more complex strategies to protect and preserve their privacy online. These 
contrasting findings highlight the difficult and complex nature of changing and diverse user 
attitudes towards privacy, and the double-edged nature of social networking via the internet 
as a tool either for the co-ordination of protest and civil disorder, or to advance criminal 
investigation into such disorder.  
The vast amount of user submitted data, accumulating at an estimated 30 billion (US) pieces 
per month for Facebook alone (Facebook 2011), is of considerable value to the law 
enforcement community. However, leveraging such information also has the potential to form 
a digital panopticon, where civil liberties are suppressed by ongoing monitoring and analysis.  
 
2.3 Public support for online law enforcement activities 
There have been numerous instances of the general public making use of online SNS to 
retrieve stolen goods, including an incident during the London riots (BBC News 2011a). In this 
instance the owner used remote access software to determine to the criminal’s personal 
details from their web browsing habits. The criminal’s Facebook page provided sufficient 
 7 
 
information for the police to find and arrest the individual. It is worth noting that the inverse 
case also holds, that if a criminal can access an individual’s Facebook profile they may be able 
to determine where that person lives, whether they are currently on holiday and have left 
their property unguarded etc,. Cases of identity theft using social network data are also 
becoming more common, and are an active area of academic research (Bilge et al. 2009, 
Nosko, Wood & Molema 2010). 
The active participation of victims in the investigation of theft involving internet enabled 
devices such as phones and laptops is becoming more commonplace, as both free and 
commercial tools are available to support the locating of such devices including LocateMe1 
and Find My Iphone2.  The UK Police endorse the Immobilise3 possession ownership database, 
a free third party service that allows the police to match seized property with its original 
owners. This service complements existing government sponsored services such as the NMPR 
(National Mobile Property Register)4, and third party purchase investigation services such as 
CheckMEND5. It is arguable that given the limited resources of the police, both the free and 
commercial sector may provide useful capabilities to complement those of the police. 
 
2.4 Social networking platform capabilities  
The London riots involved considerable use of online SNS. The following section explores the 
capabilities of four major platforms that were associated with communication during the riots. 
BBM (BlackBerry Messenger) 
BBM is an instant messenger platform that allows one-to-one and group messaging. In its 
simplest form it is similar to SMS, but with unrestricted message length. BBM also supports 
picture messaging, geotagging etc. A number of countries, including India and UAE, have 
threatened to block the use of BBM given the relative privacy it offers to its clients. 
Surveillance on BBM by the police without the cooperation of RIM Ltd (Research in Motion) is 
currently infeasible on a large scale due to resource limitations, given that encryption is used 
to secure messages. 
 
                                                          
1
 LocateMe http://code.google.com/p/locateme/ consulted 5/9/2011 
2
 Find My iPhone  http://www.apple.com/uk/iphone/features/find-my-iphone.html consulted 
19/9/2011 
3
 Immobilise http://www.immobilise.com/about.html consulted 6/9/2011 
4
 NMPR http://thenmpr.com/ consulted 21/3/2012 
5
 CheckMEND http://www.checkmend.com/uk/ consulted 21/3/2012 
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Facebook 
Facebook lends itself to the organisation of events through public pages (where anyone can 
view a message) or private pages (where only those invited can view the page). In addition to 
this, a private page can be secret (groups cannot be found in searches and non-members 
cannot see anything about the group). Once the security of a page has been determined, 
there are many ways to communicate with the group. One relatively recent innovation, 
Facebook Messenger, provides a stand-alone mobile application that enables messaging 
directly to group members’ phones. The relative privacy of online groups is a potential issue 
for law enforcement agencies. 
Twitter 
Although Twitter was used maliciously during the riots it is not the strongest platform for this 
particular type of application. Twitter allows people to broadcast short (140 character) 
statements to the world, or to their closed group of followers. Twitter was not conceived with 
two way communication in mind, though it does support it with three mechanisms: 
 A private message can be sent to another person, subject to the  character limit, 
however such limited point to point communications are not ideal to organise large 
groups.  
 Replies can be posted to a specific statement using an @ hashtag 
 Using the # hashtag, a statement can be made which is easier for non followers to 
search for using Twitter’s trending feature. However, for a large scale incident any 
given message is unlikely to make much impact (given the number of postings).  
One of the limitations for criminal use of Twitter is its limited privacy functions. Although it is 
possible to  make a Twitter feed private, any person who follows it could make a reference to 
it using the @ hashtag on their own potentially public feed, effectively providing clues to the 
law enforcement community on what statements have been made on the private feed.  
 
YouTube 
YouTube was not originally conceived as a SNS (Boyd, Ellison 2007), however given its current 
features include, messaging, trending and commenting it could now be considered one. 
Videos uploaded are predominantly public in nature, though YouTube does have the facility 
for private video hosting. YouTube is not ideally suited to private communications, as private 
videos have an access control limitation of 50 viewers. Therefore in terms of communication 
 9 
 
relating to civil disturbance the ability to privately discuss and plan using the platform is 
limited. 
 
3. The London Riots in context 
In order to explore the way in which online SNS impacted on the London riots it is first 
necessary to understand the much older concept of flash mobs, to which an introduction is 
provided in section 3.1. Section 3 then builds upon this by exploring the way in which online 
SNS were observed to impact on the London riots, before finally discussing the support the 
current UK legal framework provides in dealing with the monitoring, handling and evidence 
gathering associated with this type of disturbance. 
3.1 Flash Mobs 
Dependent on the context, Flash Mobs, where groups of individuals arrange in advance to 
meet up at a specific time and place, can be either a force for order or public disorder. Dating 
back to the early 2000s, Flash Mobs were primarily conceived as an art form. One author 
described them as instances of ‘tactical frivolity’ (Amparo, Martínez de Albéniz 2009) 
One of the earliest recognised flash mobs involved 300 people converging on Toys “R” Us in 
Time Square New York, and spontaneously worshipping at the feet of a large dinosaur, before 
peacefully dispersing a few minutes later (Cayley 2009). The related term Smart Mob may also 
be encountered, though media sources rarely use the term, to describe longer term activities 
with specific goals, often political such as those associated with the Arab Spring of 2011.  
Although arguably not the most accurate source of information it is interesting to note from a 
societal perspective that Wikipedia’s definition of Flash Mobs (Wikipedia 2011) was modified 
to include the potential use of violence, around the time of the London riots of 2011. 
However, the dictionary definitions quoted in support of the article still show the pre-2011 
concept of flash mobs as ‘pointless activities’6  (as of the 23rd August 2011). It would appear 
the events of 2011 are outpacing the definition of how such concepts can be used. The pace of 
evolution may cause difficulties in applying current legal frameworks, something which may 
be evident in the variety of sentences given for similar crimes during the period in question. 
 
                                                          
6
 Defined as “a public gathering of complete strangers, organized via the Internet or mobile phone, who 
perform a pointless act and then disperse again.” Oxford Dictionaries, Published by the Oxford 
University Press. http://oxforddictionaries.com/ consulted 6/9/2011 
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3.2 Online SNS, Rioters, Community and the law 
 Amparo and Martinez de Albeniz  (Amparo, Martínez de Albéniz 2009) 
were early believers that the definition of a Flash Mob should encompass the potential for 
political and violent behaviour, proposing that the main utility of Social Networking and 
mobile devices in support of such behaviour includes: 
 Calls to mobilisation (to demonstrations, protests, violence etc) 
 As a communication platform for activities 
 For the dissemination of news, rumour and propaganda 
 To support citizen surveillance activities 
 The use of technology to support technological activism such as hacking (sometimes 
referred to as hacktivism7) 
 To chronicle the activities undertaken for a particular cause. 
The use of social networking for protest purposes has varied from small scale activities to 
large scale protest groups such as the No Mas Farc group in Columbia, which had 13 million 
Facebook followers (Etling, Faris & Palfrey 2010) (Laer, Aelst 2009) at its peak. One notable 
phenomenon seen in these cases appears to be a belief in safety in numbers.  It is plausible 
that many of those who have subsequently been charged for offences relating to social 
networking during the London riots believed the same thing. Laer (ibid) separated the actions 
taken by citizens into ‘internet based’ and ‘internet supported’ in order to separate those 
activities that were designed to enhance existing physical activities through technology, such 
as organising a demonstration, from those that use technology to achieve something purely 
virtual such as hacking, the creation of protest websites etc. Laer further postulated that the 
internet had lowered the thresholds associated with undertaking such activities, i.e. that the 
internet has made it considerably easier for people to perform acts of civil disobedience. 
Consider the options open to a protestor in the 1980s who wished to spread a message, 
compared to that of a protestor today. What would have entailed a significant amount of time 
and resources in spreading a message via perhaps volunteers and pamphlets can now be 
achieved virtually using Twitter, in a matter of seconds. 
However, the public backlash against such online actions can be equally swift. A number of 
examples (BBC News 2011c)  were recorded during the London riots of citizens reporting 
                                                          
7
 Defined as “a person who attempts to gain unauthorized access to computer files or networks to 
further social or political ends” Oxford Dictionaries, Published by the Oxford University Press. 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/ consulted 6/9/2011 
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social networking pages/feeds that were involved in illegal activities.  Citizens were also quick 
to place a petition on the number 10 Downing Street petition page to strip offenders of social 
housing if they received it (247,364 signatories as of 5th October 2011); a movement so 
popular it overloaded the petition system for several hours (BBC News 2011b). Perhaps more 
ominously Laer also discusses transnational characteristics of social networking. Given the 
global recession in 2011 were they fortunate that the seemingly purposeless rioting did not  
cross national boundaries? 
Two of the more unanticipated uses of social media during the riots were as a force for 
community defence and cleanup activities. The Twitter feed @riotcleanup attracted over 
74,000 followers (as of 19/9/2011), the #Londonriots trending tag was also used extensively 
(over 55,700 times as of 22/3/2013). Facebook groups such as Liverpool Cleanup, which has 
849 members 8 helped organise community cleanup events in the wake of the riots. Some 
groups including ‘Singhs Defending Southall Gurdwaras’ 9 used social networking sites such as 
Facebook to organise themselves during the riots to defend property. The police response to 
what could be termed vigilante behaviour by some groups was muted, possibly due to the 
number of cases involved in the riots, and overstretched police resources during the riots, 
which left many areas temporarily un-defendable by traditional means. 
One of the most useful aspects of Facebook within the law enforcement community is the 
relationships it highlights between individuals.  Mcillwain (Mcillwain 1999) postulated that 
‘upperworld’ and ‘underworld’ actors are bound into “social systems of organized crime”. 
Such relationships are undoubtedly one of the more useful features from the perspectives of 
investigation and evidence gathering. However, social networks such as Facebook and Twitter 
provide only a binary relationship of friend/follower or not friend/follower (Livingstone 2008).  
It is also notable that definition for behaviour need to go beyond that of the traditional view 
of organised crime outlined by Mcillwain, to encompass the more casual, opportunistic and 
spontaneous elements evident during the London riots.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=158783327533310 consulted 19/9/2011    
9
 http://www.facebook.com/pages/Singhs-Defending-Southall-Gurdwaras-UKLondon-
Riots/249763281710657 consulted 19/9/2011 
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3.3 The online presence of the Metropolitan Police Service 
The following section examines the ways in which SNS are used by the Metropolitan Police 
Service (the main police body within the greater London area). It focuses on two key 
communication platforms, Twitter and YouTube. The section does not cover Facebook, as the 
Metropolitan Police Service Facebook page was created in response to the London Riots 
(December 2011), however they now make extensive use of Facebook to elaborate on the 
initiatives outlined in their Twitter feed. 
 
3.3.1 Twitter 
The Metropolitan Police Service operates multiple Twitter feeds, including sub-feeds for each 
London Borough police force (created after the riots), however their primary Twitter feed for 
outgoing messages is @metpoliceuk.  Figure 1 illustrates the increase in official tweets by the 
Metropolitan Police Service during the riot period. The red line indicates the average number 
of tweets per day since the account was created (to 22/3/2013), as approximately 6 per day, 
rising to 16 per day during the main period of riots and subsequent arrests. Research by 
Krishnamurphy et al (Krishnamurphy, Gill & Arlitt 2008) defined three broad categories for 
Twitter users: 
 Broadcasters (Who have large followings without reciprocating) 
 Acquaintances (With similar numbers of those following and followers) 
 Spammers, Evangelists (Who follow without reciprocation) 
By this categorisation the @metpoliceuk feed is a broadcaster. The same is true of the London 
Borough Twitter sub-feeds. 
 
Figure 1: Twitter use by the Metropolitan Police Service 
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The scope of the current research did not extend to in-depth analysis of the messages sent, 
however, the following key points were noted: 
 A decision was made to move from individual crime reporting to the reporting of 
aggregate crime figures for the riot period. These tweets focussed on tallies on the 
number of incidents and associated arrest figures.  
 The police did not make use of the #londonriots trending tag. This had two particularly 
notable effects: 
o The popularity of the #londonriots tag could not directly increase viewing of 
the Metropolitan Police Service Twitter feed via Twitters trending function. 
o Consequently, this allowed the Metropolitan Police Service to avoid using the 
term ‘londonriots’ in public communications.  
 The police made extensive use of Flickr, posting pages of CCTV images via Twitter to 
engage the public in identifying criminal behaviour (these images have since been 
removed from Flickr, though they do make use of Flickr to identify suspects and stolen 
goods for many offences). 
It is also worth noting that a report by a police officer within the London Metropolitan Police 
Service prior to the first night of the riots was raised in their strategic review (Metropolitan 
Police Service 2011). In the incident an officer reported reading three identical Tweets on 
separate feeds “Hearing there’s a riot in Tottenham you know or they planning one. I hope 
this is the start of a new era and people start deading feds”. The Metropolitan Police Service 
investigated that afternoon, but did not believe there was cause for concern. The strategic 
review believed this was not a failing of intelligence, given the incidents that occurred were 
unprecedented for London. The strategic review recommended considerably more effort be 
placed into infrastructure and resourcing for social networking going forward, of which the 
new Facebook presence, and sub-Twitter feeds played a prominent role. 
 
3.3.3 YouTube 
The Metropolitan Police Service YouTube channel is used predominantly to give advice on 
crime prevention, to explain police procedures, and occasionally to show CCTV footage 
relating to cases. However, despite averaging approx 6 videos per month during the period 
2012-2013 it was not used for communication during the London riots (given Flickr was used 
temporarily, but the images were later removed; it is possible the same was true of YouTube).  
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The strategic review (Metropolitan Police Service 2011) categorised the Metropolitan Police 
Service use of Youtube as ‘sporadic’ and primarily for ‘one way dialogue’. 
Youtube was however used extensively by others to communicate and comment upon the 
incidents that took place. In many instances this involved footage illegally recorded from news 
channels, which highlights the issues YouTube has in policing itself. 
 
3.4 Online Crime reporting by the public 
This section predominantly examines the role that online presence plays in crime reporting 
within London, however, considerable research could usefully be undertaken to explore the 
wider use of social media by the 43 separate police forces within the UK.  
Crimes relating to internet fraud do have a centralised web point of contact within the UK 
(ActionFraud.police.uk), however this is run by the National Fraud Authority rather than the 
police directly, and therefore has a relatively narrow remit for reporting. The process of 
reporting is questionnaire based, lacking the immediacy of many forms of social media. Within 
London Metropolitan Police Service PCeU (Police Central e-Crime Unit) operates across a 
wider remit allowing the reporting of offline crimes online, however the process is again 
relatively bureaucratic in terms of the information required to report, for example, a crime 
being planned through a social networking page. The website10 also sets a relatively poor 
standard for WCAG 11 compliance by little or no guidance for filling in the online forms.  This is 
a significant issue when considering the geographic placement of a given crime. Take the 
following scenario: 
A person observes a crime being planned by a third party using a social networking site.  
The PCeU website will only investigate crimes in the Greater London area. Does this therefore 
imply that in order to use the service: 
A) The observer be London based? 
B) The criminal be London based? 
C) The webserver be London based? (which is likely to be implausible for the observer 
to determine) 
D) The crime that is being planned should take place in London? 
                                                          
10
 Metropolitan Police Service reporting https://online.met.police.uk/report/report.php Accessed 
25/3/2013 
11
 W3C WCAG 2.0 Standard http://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG/  Accessed 25/3/2013 
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E) All, some, or none of the above? 
Interestingly, the Metropolitan Police Service force Facebook page states explicitly that crimes 
should not be reported to them via it. Further, as the page states that content on their page is 
not monitored 24 hours a day, the only way to report inappropriate behaviour on their page is 
via email. They make very clear that crimes observed online should be reported by phone only 
(via 999 or 101).  
The same statement is made on their Twitter feed, however, despite the clarity of the 
message many people choose to ignore this. During a one day snapshot (24/3/2013) of 
@metpoliceuk the following data were collected: 
Mentions: 56 
Mentions attempting to report crimes: 9 
Percentage: 16% 
Many of the messages related to minor road traffic crimes, and had associated images 
uploaded. This indicates that although the police do not wish to receive crime reports in this 
manner, it is arguable that the current online system is considered too cumbersome to report 
minor infractions identified by the public, or that many are not aware of its role.  
The Metropolitan Police Service YouTube channel goes one step further by stating that 
messages sent to them via the YouTube message service are not read, highlighting an issue 
relating to the extent to which SNS can be customised to their users needs. 
 
3.5 Legal support for online police activities 
Organisations such as Facebook, RIM (Research in Motion) and Twitter were quick to state 
support for the law enforcement community. However, a number of instances have been 
reported in the past of less than adequate support, including those by Milivojevic (Milivojevic 
2011): 
“The Australian Federal Police (AFP) Assistant Commissioner and Head of High Tech 
Crime Operations, Neil Gaughan, is quoted as saying that ‘Facebook’s woeful 
relationship with law enforcement bodies is hampering police investigation and 
putting lives at risk” 
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Time Magazine (Handley 2010) featured an article in 2010 discussing British Government 
issues relating to the removal of the Facebook content of known criminals. The article includes 
a prominent quote by Richard Allan, director of policy for Facebook within Europe: 
"We have 400 million active users and a tiny, tiny staff. We need to find novel ways to 
handle that kind of crushing amount of activity. It's the burden of being so immensely 
popular."  
Given the recent disturbances in London companies such as Facebook are likely to have to 
adapt their procedures, as are the police (May 2011). One suggestion raised during the riots 
was that in future the British government should be able to block access to SNS in times of 
civil unrest. During the riots there had been some calls to shut down the Blackberry 
messenger service given its role in riot organisation (Pettifor, Gregory & Layton 2011).  Such a 
decision within a democratic country is not unprecedented. On the 11th of August 2011, the 
San Francisco BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) network blocked access to mobile phones within 
their stations, in order to forestall a protest rumoured to take place that day, prompting an 
FCC investigation (The Federal Communications Commission 2012). 
In terms of deterring crime, some of the longer sentences given to rioters related to 
incitement to riot via social networking sites, including the four year sentences given to Jordan 
Blackshaw and Sutcliffe Keenan (The Crown Prosecution Service 2011), despite the 
disturbances they planned not having occurred. Their subsequent appeal against what their 
lawyer termed ‘manifestly unfair’ sentencing was rejected. This opens an interesting debate 
on the meaning of data stored across social networking sites. Without visual and audio cues to 
provide additional insight and context for a given action, police only have the posted written 
statements from which to derive meaning. The ongoing publication of aspects of our lives 
using social media, without consideration for how such information may be received by law 
authorities, employers, friends and strangers was dubbed “communicating in their [sic] virtual 
underwear” in one notable publication (Rosenblum 2007). There have been a considerable 
number of court cases where evidence from social networking has either been used in order 
to indict, or has involved dubious or unacceptable conduct on the behalf of jurors, lawyers and 
even judges (Nelson, Simek & Foltin 2009). In one court case a judge and the attorney for the 
defence become ‘friends’ on Facebook, and discussed the case in question using Facebook  
during the court case. As a result of an earlier ruling on the freedoms of the press within court 
rooms the London Riots saw widespread use of Twitter by the media to report on live court 
proceedings during the chaotic court days following the commencement of civil 
disorder(Goodman 2011). 
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A number of laws have a bearing on the London riots, prominent points on which are explored 
below: 
 Although rarely enforced, the Counter Terrorism Act of 2008 (UK Government 2008)  
contains provisions to prevent members of the public from taking photographs of 
police officers in public. However, the provisions were designed to counter terrorism, 
and  the prominence of the police in online footage relating to the riots ensured that 
police actions are highly visible to the world (Etling, Faris & Palfrey 2010).. 
 The Communications Act of 2003 (UK Government 2003) has been used in the past to 
prosecute those who have posted illegal information on social networking sites. One 
of the first widely publicised cases related to a man antagonised by the closure of his 
local airport, who posted on Twitter that he would “blow it up”, who was reported to 
the police by the airport management (Brooke 2010).  
 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 (UK Government 2000) is the 
primary Act the police use to request communications data from SNS in order to 
conduct investigations. Interestingly, RIPA does not require the originator of the data 
to be informed that it has been the subject of a RIPA request. 
 The UK government have the power to block websites which infringe copyright 
through the court system using the Digital Economy Act of 2010 (UK Government 
2010). They also have the right remove content which contravenes the Terrorism Act 
of 2006 (UK Government 2006). However, it is unclear whether the government could 
legally block services such as Twitter, Facebook, etc.  
 
4. Future trends and their implications  
SNS have evolved considerably in the last decade, and will continue to do so in future. The 
ongoing evolution of services could affect users and the law enforcement community in a 
number of ways. Some of the prominent issues in this area include: 
 Increased use of artefact geotagging using mobile equipment (photographs,blog and 
micro blog posts etc) using inbuilt GPS receivers, or triangulation.  The lack of user 
awareness for default settings for geotagging could cause privacy issues. Geotagging is 
turned on by default on platforms such as the iPhone camera, and are off by default 
on others such as Twitter. However, the resource implications for such data use in 
investigations are considerable. 
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 Live SNS data mining tools are now common, including tools such as Monitter12 for 
Twitter. Recent research in this area shows  that civil disturbances of the type seen 
during the London Riots could potentially be predicted in advance (Lansdall-Welfare, 
Vasileios & Cristianini 2012) given sufficient resources. There is a clear issue with 
members of the public wanting to report crime via social networking despite being 
told not to do so. There are also issues relating to the lack of trained online SNS 
monitoring police staff (Metropolitan Police Service 2011)  
 Increased use of video uploads rather than textual information poses a considerable 
problem for future law enforcement.  YouTube video uploads in 201013 amounted to 
13 million hours of footage, over double that uploaded in 2009. Forensic examination 
of video footage is considerably more complicated than text. It has been estimated 
that over 40,000 hours of video footage were gathered during the London Riots 
(Halliday 2011). The footage could take years to examine, collate and categorise. 
Academic research (Sarfraz, Zafar & Edirisinghe 2011) (Senior 2009)  (Dee, Velastin 
2008) in this area may well provide automated and semi-automated solutions to the 
problem, however they are unlikely to do so in the near future, causing a capability 
gap which could cause a considerable drain on human resources. 
 
5. Future Work and Conclusions 
Evidence has shown the use of online SNS to organise, defend against and monitor civil 
disturbances. Although focussed primarily on one of the largest civil disturbances to occur in 
the UK, the London riots of 2011, the paper has drawn on other examples from across the 
world highlighting a global issue.  
It is arguable that the information currently being analysed in support of legal cases is already 
stretching the resources of the law enforcement system as it currently stands. In particular it is 
clear that the government will need to embrace the use of new services to support reporting 
by the public of issues encountered, monitoring by the police, and efficient, procedurally 
acceptable evidence gathering from social networking media. 
                                                          
12
 Monitter www.monitter.com Accessed 26/3/2013 
13
 YouTube www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics consulted 7/9/2011 
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 It will also be necessary to determine new methods and techniques to support categorising, 
analysing and storing evidence for online social networking investigations. In addition the 
growth, evolution and potential disruptive use of online SNS will continue to evolve our 
understanding of information and systems theories, and significant potential exists for more 
long-term studies into the use of online SNS for disruptive purposes. 
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